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Abstract 
Preventable medical errors are now the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 
(CDC) third leading cause of death, which equates to 9.5% of all deaths in the United States, or 
nearly 700 deaths per day.  One of these preventable medical errors is wrong-site surgery.  
Wrong-site surgery (WSS) is defined as “any surgical procedure performed on the wrong patient, 
wrong body part, wrong side of the body, or at the wrong level of the correctly identified 
anatomic site” (The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 2010, p. 786).  The 
purpose of this project is to examine what measures have been implemented to prevent these 
errors from occurring and to examine what can be done to prevent these serious errors.  This 
project is pertinent because errors in healthcare delivery pose a direct threat to patient safety and 
healthcare professionals need to fully understand standardized protocols, error causation, and be 
knowledgeable of ways to prevent these unsafe events.  This project is a literature review on 
medical error studies and case studies of wrong-site surgeries.  Several medical databases were 
used to search for peer-reviewed articles. Using root-cause analysis, the top causes of WSS were 
found to be communication failures, procedural compliance issues, and complications in 
leadership.  Studies have demonstrated that “safety net” implementations have led to improved 
outcomes, as well as switching the focus to systems accountability rather than personal 
accountability when mistakes are made.  Systems accountability, or just culture, is when events 
can be reported and errors can be examined, so conclusions can be reached and actions taken to 
be collectively understood.  Medical errors can be prevented by following the universal protocol 
established for surgical procedures and by healthcare systems establishing a non-punitive 
environment in order to create a safety culture. 
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Introduction 
The healthcare industry is an essential part of our everyday lives.  Health care is generally 
seen as effective; however, this is not always the case, particularly when medical mistakes and 
errors occur.  The Institute of Medicine defines a medical error as “the failure of a planned action 
to be completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim” (Kohn, Corrigan, & 
Donaldson, 2000, p. 1).  This study reported that at least 44,000 people, and possibly as many as 
98,000 people, die in hospitals each year as a result of medical errors that could have been 
prevented, according to estimates from two major studies (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 
2000).  This study was published in 1999 and in 2017, researchers at John Hopkins University 
are estimating that more than 250,000 deaths per year are due to medical error in the United 
States (Daniel, 2016).  That figure has surpassed the Centers for Disease Control’s third leading 
cause of death (Daniel, 2016).  
Background 
Research on deaths caused by medical errors has been challenging to conduct.  Since 
1949, the United States has been using the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) billing 
codes to classify and count causes of death (Daniel & Mackary, 2016).  Medical errors were not 
originally included in the ICD classification system, so it has been under-recognized as a cause 
of death, meaning researcher’s estimates about the fatal impact of medical errors may be lower 
than reported (Daniel & Mackary, 2016).  The current calculated figure for medical errors 
translates to 9.5% of all deaths each year in the United States and equates to nearly 700 deaths a 
day (Daniel & Mackary, 2016).  One major medical error noted in “To Err is Human,” is wrong-
site surgery.  Wrong-site surgery is defined as “any surgical procedure performed on the wrong 
patient, wrong body part, wrong side of the body, or at the wrong level of the correctly identified 
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anatomic site” (The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 2010).  This 
definition also includes “any invasive procedure that exposes patients to more than minimal risk, 
including procedures performed in settings other than the OR (operating room), such as a special 
procedures unit, an endoscopy unit, and an interventional radiology suite” (Mulloy & Hughes, 
2008, p. 381).  The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) 
also defines wrong-site surgery as a sentinel event, or “an unexpected occurrence involving death 
or serious physical or psychological injuries, or the risk thereof” (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008, p. 
381).  The Joint Commission Center for Transforming Healthcare’s website states that there are 
approximately 40-60 wrong site surgeries per week in the United States (The Joint Commission 
Center for Transforming Healthcare, 2018).  The American Medical Association published an 
article in 2013 which discussed a review of medical liability settlements between 1990 and 
2010.  They found that there were 2,447 cases in which the wrong procedure was performed, 
2,413 cases in which the wrong surgical site was involved, and 27 cases involving the wrong 
patient (Mehtsun, Ibrahim, Diener-West, Pronovost, Makary, 2013).  These numbers include the 
average payout amounts, so these cases were reported due to medical liability settlements and 
judgments (Mehtsun, Ibrahim, Diener-West, Pronovost, Makary, 2013).  In order to prevent 
wrong-site surgery, healthcare professionals should fully understand standardized protocols, 
error causation, and be knowledgeable of ways to prevent these unsafe events. 
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Figure A: Graphic depicting medical error as the third leading cause of death in the United 
States. 
 
Purpose 
The purpose of this literature review is to examine what measures have been 
implemented to prevent wrong-site surgery errors from occurring and to examine what can be 
done to prevent these serious errors. 
Methods 
A search of the databases CINAHL and Medline was conducted using the search terms 
“wrong site surgery,” “wrong site surgery AND causes,” “wrong site surgery AND prevention,” 
“surgical checklist,” and “punitive approach AND healthcare.”  Search parameters included peer 
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reviewed articles and articles published between 1999-2018.  Exclusion criteria included articles 
that were not in the English language, articles that required payment to view, was an abstract 
only, was a duplicate, lacked sufficient detail, and no results were reported. 
  
 
Figure B: Methods flowchart. 
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Results 
Why Errors Occur 
There have been numerous studies investigating why WSS happen.  Studies have 
investigated the various causes of solutions to WSS.  Using root-cause analysis, one study found 
that the top causes of WSS were communication failure (70%), procedural noncompliance 
(64%), and leadership (46%) (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008).  This study also discusses how the 
causes of WSS can be broken down into categories of system factors and process factors.  A 
system factor is also termed “latent error,” which is the result of an organizational system or 
design failure that will allow active errors to happen and cause harm (Collins, Newhouse, Porter, 
& Talsma, 2014).  Some examples of system factors are: 1) lack of institutional controls/formal 
system to verify the correct site of surgery, 2) lack of a checklist, 3) unusual time pressures, 4) 
team competency and credentialing, 5) organizational culture, 6) orientation and training, 7) 
staffing, and 8) environmental safety/security (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008).  A process factor or 
“active error” is defined as an error that is the result of an individual’s failure and occur at the 
point of contact between a human and an aspect of a larger system (Collins, Newhouse, Porter, & 
Talsma, 2014).  Some examples of process factors: inadequate patient assessment, inadequate 
care planning, inadequate medical record review, miscommunication among members of the 
surgical team and the patient, failure to include the patient and family when identifying the 
correct site, failure to mark or clearly mark the correct operation site, incomplete or inaccurate 
communication among members of the surgical team, failure to recheck patient information 
before starting the operation, among others (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008). 
Another example of error analysis is Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model of Errors.  Reason 
reported that “in a complex system such as health care, human error is likely to occur and that 
SENIOR HONORS THESIS 9	
expecting perfection from imperfect human beings or punishing them for their mistakes will not 
improve safety” (Collins, Newhouse, Porter, & Talsma, 2014, p. 68).  The Swiss Cheese Model 
demonstrates error prevention or an error causing harm through the application of multiple steps 
that function as a safety net (Collins, Newhouse, Porter, & Talsma, 2014).  In the OR, these 
multiple steps would be the surgical safety checklist, the surgical team, and policy and 
procedures.  Reason notes, “each defensive layer can be viewed as a slice of Swiss cheese.  
Holes are present in several defense layers, and, unintentionally, the holes can line up, allowing 
an error to occur” (Collins, Newhouse, Porter, & Talsma, 2014, p. 68).  This model focuses on 
not personal accountability, but rather systems accountability when mistakes are made.  The 
model demonstrates a broader viewpoint for determining how to prevent the error from 
recurring.  (Collins, Newhouse, Porter, & Talsma, 2014).  Another major factor of Reason’s 
model is that just culture is essential and must be established within the organization to create 
and sustain a safety culture (Collins, Newhouse, Porter, & Talsma, 2014).  He also concluded 
that “the human condition cannot be altered; however, the environment in which the human 
functions can be controlled to reduce variability” (Collins, Newhouse, Porter, & Talsma, 2014, p. 
69).  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
Figure C: Graphic depicting Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model of Errors. 
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A study of 417 facilities was performed by Clarke to identify the barriers to 
implementation and strategies for successful implementation of the 21 Pennsylvania Patient 
Safety Authority recommendations for preventing WSS.  The survey found that the top reason 
was physician behavior-surgeon intimidation, resistance, non-compliance, lack of accountability, 
acceptance, commitment, engagement, cooperation from surgeon officers, lack of perceived 
value, surgeons unavailable, and surgeons overriding protocols (Clark, 2012).  Other top reasons 
were difficulty with accurate pre-op information, time pressures, education of personnel, 
inability to see site markings, general communication problems, and the need to change culture 
(Clark, 2012).  Another study examining the barriers to implementation of a checklist conducted 
by Papaconstantinou et al., found barriers to be: redundancy of items in existing checklists, poor 
communication between surgical team members, negative perception of efficiency, time spent 
completing the checklist, and a lack of understanding and commitment to the process 
(Papaconstantinou, ChanHee, Reznik, Smythe, & Wehbe-Janek, 2013). 
In human factor analysis, two approaches have been used.  One approach, critical 
incident analysis, examines a significant occurrence to understand where the system broke down, 
why the incident occurred, and the circumstances surrounding the incident (Kohn, Corrigan, & 
Donaldson, 2000).  This type of analysis helps to provide an understanding of the conditions that 
produced an actual error, the risk of an error and contributing factors (Kohn, Corrigan, & 
Donaldson, 2000).  One study regarding anesthesia using critical incident analysis, found that 
human error was involved in 82% of preventable incidents (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 
2000).  Another analytic approach is called naturalistic decision making.  This approach 
examines the way people make decisions in their natural work settings (Kohn, Corrigan, & 
Donaldson, 2000).  The analysis can help to uncover the factors weighed in making the decisions 
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when faced with ambiguous information under time pressure (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 
2000).  Through a process of reporting, investigation, innovation, and dissemination, the analysis 
process can result in a shift in the industry baseline performance.  This study concluded that 
reporting or identifying errors can aid people in discovering where errors are occurring and 
where improvements can be made (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000).  
Current Error Prevention Practices 
It is hard to determine the prevalence of wrong-site surgeries because reporting of 
sentinel events to the Joint Commission is voluntary.  Mulloy and Hughes note that researchers 
have confirmed that the Joint Commission’s numbers are low and found wide variations in the 
number of WSSs: 1 out of 27, 686 cases, or 1 out of every 112,994 surgeries, or 1 in 5 hand 
surgeons during their career, or 1 out of 4 orthopedic surgeons with 25 years’ 
experience” (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008).  Even though the prevalence is difficult to determine, 
these devastating medical errors can be prevented with standardization across perioperative 
settings.  The Joint Commission also released their number of reported sentinel events to 
demonstrate the increase over time.  In 1998, there were 15 reported cases compared to June 30th, 
2007, when there were 592 reported cases (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008). 
One of the first attempts to address wrong site surgery was in 2003.  The Joint 
Commission held a summit in order to address the dramatic increase in wrong site surgeries 
(WSS).  One of the major outcomes from JCAHO’s summit was a new protocol called “The 
Universal Protocol for Preventing Wrong Site, Wrong Procedure, and Wrong Person 
Surgery.”  This protocol would be used in settings for any invasive procedure is performed.  The 
Universal Protocol was developed based on prevention theories that direct safe practices in other 
high-risk industries, including aviation and nuclear weapon development (Mulloy & Hughes, 
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2008).  The three elements for the WSS protocol include a preoperative verification process, 
marking the operative site, and taking a time out.  These three elements are now required as part 
of the accreditation process for health care organizations by the Joint Commission (Mulloy & 
Hughes, 2008).  In 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) published the Surgical Safety 
Checklist as part of the “Safe Surgery Saves Lives Campaign” (Pugel, Simianu, Flum, & 
Dellinger, 2015).  The checklist was adapted from the field of aviation.  The purpose of the 
checklist was to help OR teams remember important details and to serve as a tool to encourage 
teamwork and communication.  The WHO encourages hospitals to customize the checklist to 
their needs, but the general format should remain the same.  Studies have validated the efficacy 
and benefits various checklists, but the mechanism by which this occurs is unclear (Pugel, 
Simianu, Flum, & Dellinger, 2015). 
The first step to be implemented in the Universal Protocol is the preoperative verification 
process.  The purpose of this is (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008): 
to ensure that all of the relevant documents and studies are available prior to the start of 
the procedure and that they have been reviewed and are consistent with each other and 
with the patient’s expectations and with the team’s understanding of the intended patient, 
procedure, site, and, as applicable, any implants.  Missing information or discrepancies 
must be addressed before starting the procedure. (p. 384)  
This verification process should occur (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008): 
at the time of the surgery/procedure is scheduled, at the time of admission to the facility, 
anytime the responsibility for care of the patient is transferred to another caregiver, with 
the patient involved, awake, and aware, if possible, and before the patient leaves the 
preoperative area or enters the surgical room. (p. 384) 
SENIOR HONORS THESIS 13	
The next step is marking the operative site. The purpose of this is “to identify 
unambiguously the intended site of incision or insertion” (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008, p. 
384).  There are various specific instructions for marking the intended site.  One important aspect 
is that the mark must be made using a marker that is sufficiently permanent to remain visible 
after completion of the skin prep application.  The person performing the procedure is the person 
who should mark the site.  Marking must take place with the patient involved, awake, and aware, 
if possible.  Final verification of the site mark must take place during the “time out.” There are a 
few exemptions for site marking as well.  These are: single organ cases (such as cesarean section, 
cardiac surgery), interventional cases for which the catheter/instrument insertion site is not 
predetermined (cardiac catheterization), teeth, or premature infants because the mark may cause 
a permanent tattoo (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008). 
         The final step is the time out.  The purpose is “to conduct a final verification of the 
correct patient, procedure, site and, as applicable, implants” (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008, p. 
384).  The time out process should involve active communication among all members of the 
surgical team and should be conducted in the location where the procedure will be done, just 
before starting the procedure.  The time out should also be briefly documented and include 
correct patient identity, correct side and site, agreement on the procedure to be done, correct 
patient position, and the availability of correct implants and any special equipment or special 
requirements (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008).  The procedure should not be started until any questions 
or concerns are resolved.  A study that investigated a pre-procedural briefing in cardiac surgery 
(similar to the WHO surgical safety checklist), found that the number of miscommunication 
events declined by 50% in the briefing group compared to the group that did not use the briefing 
tool (Pugel, Simianu, Flum, & Dellinger, 2015). 
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Figure D: The World Health Organization’s Surgical Safety Checklist (first edition). 
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chart reviews, case studies, and surveys of several professional organizations (Mulloy & Hughes, 
2008).  Another problem with this specific research is that medical error data are often 
transferred to medical claims data and medical liability, which prevents the sharing of data 
(Mulloy & Hughes, 2008), and there are no randomized control studies that evaluate the effect of 
the Universal Protocol on WSS.  A recent implementation that aids research is some states have 
recently required mandatory reporting on events like WSS (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008).  It is 
important for healthcare professionals to adhere to the Universal Protocol, as studies have 
investigated its efficacy in perioperative settings.  One study found that when discrepancies 
occurred with clinicians, a review of patient information could resolve the discrepancy (Mulloy 
& Hughes, 2008), so preoperative verification was found to be beneficial.  Two studies found 
that the time out component can prevent the majority of WSS, but not all (Mulloy & Hughes, 
2008).  Mulloy and Hughes suggest that eliminating WSS errors requires a systems approach and 
“institutionalizing robust systems” to help correct site verification and that will address potential 
causes of breakdowns in the systems (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008).  
In a study done by Bohmer about the implementation of a safety checklist, a survey of 
employees 3 months after the introduction of the checklist, the researchers found that from a staff 
perspective, “safety factors can be handled significantly better and with greater awareness by 
implementing a safety checklist” (Bohmer et al., 2012, p. 36).  Braff conducted a literature 
review that explored the role of documents and documentation in communication failure in the 
perioperative setting.  They found that effective communication is an essential aspect for the 
delivery of safe patient care (Braff, Manias, & Riley, 2011).  One explanation for improved 
patient outcomes with the use of safety checklists is that the use of a checklist can improve the 
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safety culture by facilitating communication between the health care team (Pugel, Simianu, 
Flum, & Dellinger, 2015). 
Kalapurakal et al. instituted a voluntary error reporting system to record errors.  The 
researchers also implemented checklists, time outs, and monitored staff compliance, which 
successfully eliminated the errors (Kalapurakal et al., 2013).  In a prospective observational 
study done by Mainthia, the researchers implemented an electronic whiteboard that was 
interactive during the time out process.  The circulator would read out each item and check it off 
once it was completed.  Required steps were colored red and once steps were completed, it 
turned green.  This process took an average of thirty-five seconds to complete.  The researchers 
found a statistically significant increase in time out procedural compliance, which improved 
patient outcomes and reduced preventable complications and death (Mainthia et al., 2012).  In 
Papaconstantinou’s study of barriers to checklist implementation, they found that explaining why 
and showing how, active leadership, deliberate enrollment, extensive discussion and training, 
piloting, multidisciplinary communication, real-time coaching, and ongoing feedback were 
effective ways for implementing a checklist (Papaconstantinou, ChanHee, Reznik, Smythe, & 
Wehbe-Janek, 2013).  Thakkar and Mears performed a prospective randomized controlled trial to 
quantitatively and qualitatively evaluate the visibility of the surgical site markings after using 
two different skin prep solutions (chlorhexidine or iodine based).  In this study, black permanent 
marker was used to mark the patient’s skin and patients were randomly assigned to either the 
chlorhexidine or iodine skin prep application. The analysis was performed by ten orthopedic 
surgeons, which found that chlorhexidine-based skin preparation solution erased surgical 
markings more frequently than iodine-based skin preparations (Thakkar & Mears, 2012).  The 
researchers noted that additional research was needed to find a skin prep solution that has 
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maximum effect to prevent infections and does not erase site markings (Thakkar & Mears, 
2012).  
Hospital and surgery center leaders and managers should ensure that their center adheres 
to the standardization of the Universal Protocol, as well as evaluate their policies regarding WSS 
to ensure prevention is effective.  All healthcare personnel should be aware and knowledgeable 
about the Universal Protocol, not just surgeons. Studies found that executive and clinical leaders 
need to communicate expectations to physicians and staff, provide resources, be a visible 
support, and recognize individual and organizational successes (Rydrych, Apold, & Harder, 
2012).  Another aspect of safe care is designing jobs with attention to human factors.  This 
means that institutions need to pay consideration to work hours, workloads, staffing ratios, 
sources of distraction, and an inversion in assigned shifts, and their relationship to fatigue, 
alertness, and sleep deprivation (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000).  Designing jobs for safety 
also means “addressing staff training needs and anticipating harm that may accompany 
downsizing, staff turnover, and the use of part-time workers and ‘floats’” (Kohn, Corrigan, & 
Donaldson, 2000, p. 170).  The development of standards is important in the healthcare industry.  
Standards can establish minimum levels of performance or can establish consistency or 
uniformity across multiple individuals and organizations (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 
2000).  Developing standards can also set expectations for the organizations and health 
professionals involved (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000).  Current standards in health care 
“do not provide adequate focus on patient safety…organizational licensure accreditation focus 
on…credentialing, quality improvement, and risk management, but lack a specific focus on 
patient safety issues” (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000, p. 137).  Rydrych encourages 
healthcare professionals to acknowledge their “humanness.”  Regardless of training or 
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intelligence, humans forget things, make mistakes, downplays risks, and go on auto-pilot 
(Rydrych, Apold, & Harder, 2012).  Healthcare professionals should be aware of traits that can 
contribute to medical errors.  Overconfidence and automated behaviors can lead to 
mistakes.  The surgical team must also be aware of confirmation bias, which is “discounting 
info[rmation] that disagrees with preconceived ideas” (Rydrych, Apold, & Harder, 
2012).  Birnbach et al., found evidence-based actions that can aid in preventing WSS.  They 
found that actions like leadership commitment, everyone taking responsibility, empowerment of 
governing bodies to create and enforce safety policies, elimination of preventable harm, 
establishment of a universal, uniform approach for safety management, mandated reporting of 
safety issues, errors, and near misses, and cultivation of learning as part of the organizational 
mentality (Birnbach, Rosen, Williams, Fitzpatrick, Lubarsky, & Menna, 2013).  Other evidence-
based actions to prevent WSS studied by Birnbach et al., were: 1) development of policies where 
medical staff are educated, 2) performance is monitored, 3) feedback is provided, 4) leadership 
promotes patient safety and encourages medical staff to voluntarily participate in safety 
initiatives, 5) elimination of the hierarchy so all can feel free to speak up when a patient safety 
issue is noticed, and 6) to emphasize the team approach and team responsibility (Birnbach, 
Rosen, Williams, Fitzpatrick, Lubarsky, & Menna, 2013). 
Current error response and prevention focuses on the punishment of individuals, usually 
in the form of firing the individual or pursuing legal action.  Punitive action is not an effective 
way to prevent recurrence because large system failures “represent latent failures coming 
together in an unexpected way” (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000, p. 56).  A section in “To 
Err is Human” discusses that since the same mix factors is unlikely to occur again, “efforts to 
prevent specific active errors are not likely to make the system any safer” (Kohn, Corrigan, & 
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Donaldson, 2000, p. 56).  This study also notes that a punitive response may be appropriate in 
certain cases, like in the instance of deliberate “malfeasance” (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 
2000).  This report presents some ways to prevent errors in large organizations like healthcare: 
“discovering and fixing latent failures, and decreasing their duration, are likely to have a greater 
effect on building safer systems than efforts to minimize active errors at the point at which they 
occur” (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000, p. 56). 
Discussion 
Every year since 2003, the Joint Commission releases its National Patient Safety Goals.  
One goal that is repeatedly listed, is to prevent and eliminate wrong-site surgery.  In 2018, 
JCAHO updated their newest Patient Safety goals.  “Preventing mistakes in surgery” still reigns 
on the list.  The reported numbers of WSS cases continues to rise as healthcare organizations 
become more transparent to medical errors.  In order to eliminate wrong-site surgery, institutions 
require a systems approach, with rigorous process systems to verify and address potential causes 
of breakdowns in the system.  Hospital and surgical leaders should also evaluate their current 
policies and procedures regarding WSS in order to improve on additional “safety net” resources 
and to ensure that no WSS should occur.  Health care organizations should adhere to the 
Universal Protocol, which standardizes preoperative preparations, improves function of the 
health care team, and should avert any potential for WSS.  All healthcare personnel should be 
knowledgeable and trained in the elements of the Universal Protocol: preoperative verification 
process, marking the site, and the time out.  Healthcare professionals should also speak up if they 
feel that patient safety is being compromised.  Understanding the barriers to communication can 
help to improve safety culture in these highly complicated settings.  Effective leaders 
communicate expectations, provide resources, are a visible support, and recognize individual and 
SENIOR HONORS THESIS 20	
organizational success.  When a team approach is emphasized, everyone feels responsible and 
empowered to speak up when necessary.  Healthcare standards should also provide a focus on 
patient safety, which will aid in helping to meet JCAHO’s National Patient Safety Goal of 
preventing wrong-site surgery. 
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Appendix A 
Table 1: Results Table 
 
	
Title Author & Year Purpose Results & Findings 
Wrong-Site Surgery: 
A Preventable 
Medical Error 
Mulloy & Hughes 
(2008) 
The purpose is to discuss the 
prevalence and causes of WSS and 
strategies to decrease the number 
of WSS. 
The study found that the main 
causes of WSS were 
organizational failures, 
including communication 
failure, procedural 
noncompliance, and 
leadership issues.  In order to 
prevent WSS, healthcare 
organizations should adhere 
to the Universal Protocol. 
 
What Keeps 
Facilities from 
Implementing Best 
Practices to Prevent 
Wrong-Site 
Surgery? Barriers 
and Strategies for 
Overcoming Them 
Clarke (2012) The purpose was to identify the 
barriers to implementation of the 
21 Pennsylvania Patient Safety 
Authority (PPSA) 
recommendations for preventing 
WSS.  The purpose was also to 
identify strategies for successful 
implementation of the 21 PPSA 
recommendations. 
The study found that the top 
barriers were physician 
behavior (surgeon 
intimidation, resistance, non-
compliance, lack of 
accountability, lack of 
perceived value, surgeons 
overriding protocols), 
difficulty with accurate pre-
operative information, need to 
change policy, time pressures, 
inability to see site markings, 
general communication 
problems, and a need to 
change culture. 
 
Implementation of a 
Surgical Safety 
Checklist: Impact on 
Surgical Team 
Perspectives 
Papaconstantinou et 
al. (2013) 
The purpose was to evaluate a 
surgical team’s perspectives before 
and after the implementation of a 
WHO adapted checklist. 
The study found there were 
improvements in awareness 
of patient safety, 
communication, quality of 
care, and perception of the 
value and participation in the 
time out process. 
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Title Author & Year Purpose Results & Findings 
The Role of 
Documents and 
Documentation in 
Communication 
Failure Across the 
Perioperative 
Pathway: A 
Literature Review 
Braff, Manias, & 
Riley (2011) 
The purpose was to explore the 
role of documents and 
documentation in communication 
failure among health care 
providers across the perioperative, 
intra-operative, and post-operative 
areas. 
The study found that 
documents such as surgery 
notes, anesthesia records, and 
nursing perioperative notes 
that are deficient contribute to 
the development of 
communication failure 
leading to WSS and that 
effective communication is 
vital to the delivery of safe 
patient care. 
 
A Comprehensive 
Quality Assurance 
Program for 
Personnel and 
Procedures in 
Radiation Oncology: 
Value of Voluntary 
Error Reporting and 
Checklists 
Kalapurakal et al. 
(2013) 
The purpose was to determine the 
effectiveness of a voluntary error 
reporting system to record errors.  
The purpose was to analyze the 
clinical impact and guide 
implementation for future 
measures. 
The study found that the 
voluntary error database 
recorded 356 total errors.  
The program had instituted 
checklists, time outs, and 
monitored staff compliance, 
which successfully eliminated 
the errors. 
 
Novel Use of 
Electronic 
Whiteboard in the 
Operating Room 
Increases Surgical 
Team Compliance 
with Pre-Incision 
Safety Practices 
Mainthia et al. 
(2012) 
The purpose was to determine the 
effectiveness of an interactive 
electronic checklist system. 
The study found that pre-
intervention observations 
demonstrated that checklists 
involved only 49.7% of the 
core elements, while 1-month 
post-intervention showed that 
checklists involved 81.6% of 
the core elements, and 9-
month post-intervention 
showed 85.6% of core 
elements.  There was a 
statistically significant 
increase in time procedural 
compliance. 
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Title Author & Year Purpose Results & Findings 
A Framework for 
Patient Safety: A 
Defense Nuclear 
Industry-Based 
High-Reliability 
Model 
Birnbach et al. 
(2013) 
The purpose is to discuss strategies 
and evidence-based actions to 
prevent WSS. 
The study found effective 
strategies, such as: 
establishing a universal 
approach for safety 
management, mandate 
reporting or safety issues, 
errors, and near misses, 
cultivate learning as part of 
the organizational mentality, 
commitment of leadership, 
elimination of the medical 
hierarchy, and emphasis of 
the team approach. 
 
Effectiveness of the 
Surgical Safety 
Checklist in 
Correcting Errors: A 
Literature Review 
Applying Reason’s 
Swiss Cheese Model 
Collins, Newhouse, 
Porter, & Talsma 
(2014) 
The purpose was to determine the 
effectiveness of the surgical safety 
checklist in correcting and 
preventing errors in the OR. 
The study found that the 
Swiss cheese model provides 
a framework for identifying 
the problematic processes that 
lead to errors and the surgical 
safety checklist has been a 
successful intervention that 
reduces the recurrence of 
errors in the OR. 
 
Patient Safety in the 
Surgical 
Environment 
The American 
College of 
Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists 
(2010) 
The purpose was to discuss a 
systems approach involving a team 
effort by all individuals 
participating in the surgical 
process, as well as to discuss the 
effects of stress and fatigue on 
human error. 
The study found that 
communication among 
members of the surgical team 
is crucial throughout the 
surgical process, particularly 
during the preoperative phase 
and that protocols to identify 
and manage stress and fatigue 
in surgical personnel may 
help to avoid surgical errors 
and patient injuries. 
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Title Author & Year Purpose Results & Findings 
To Err is Human: 
Building a Safer 
Health System 
Institute of Medicine 
(1999) 
The purpose is to inform about the 
prevalence of medical errors in the 
United States and to recommend 
strategies on how to improve 
health care system design. 
The study found that the 
majority of medical errors do 
not result from individual 
recklessness or the actions of 
a particular group, but rather 
errors are caused by faulty 
systems, processes, and 
conditions that lead people to 
make mistakes or fail to 
prevent them.  Mistakes can 
best be prevented by 
designing the health system at 
all levels to make it safer. 
 
Study Suggests 
Medical Errors Now 
Third Leading Cause 
of Death in the U.S. 
Daniel & Makary 
(2016) 
The purpose is to discuss how 
researchers are advocating for 
updated criteria for classifying 
deaths on death certificates. 
The study found that deaths 
due to medical errors are 
underreported and that more 
research on preventing 
medical errors from occurring 
is needed.  Researchers also 
reported their estimates of 
death due to medical error, 
which translates to 9.5% of 
all deaths each year in the 
U.S. 
	
	
